Kuwait’s political system has always been sui generis in the Gulf. Its parliament — the oldest in the region — has genuine legislative power, a tradition of robust opposition, and a history of successfully challenging and dismissing governments. What it has not had, for most of the past decade, is a functional relationship with the executive branch capable of producing coherent policy.
The latest deadlock is the most severe in memory. The current parliament has blocked three successive budgets, interpelled seven ministers, and forced the resignation of two prime ministers. The government, for its part, has responded with constitutional manoeuvres that critics describe as an attempt to circumvent parliamentary oversight entirely.
The new emir, who came to power last year, has signalled a desire to break the cycle. He has met with parliamentary bloc leaders, pledged to respect constitutional norms, and appointed a prime minister seen as more politically adept than his predecessor. Whether these gestures will translate into genuine political accommodation remains the central question in Kuwaiti politics.
The economic consequences of the deadlock are becoming impossible to ignore. Kuwait’s development plan, which was supposed to drive the diversification of an economy even more oil-dependent than Saudi Arabia’s, has been effectively frozen for two years. Infrastructure projects have stalled. The private sector, never dynamic in Kuwait by Gulf standards, has further retreated. Young Kuwaitis, among the most educated in the region, are emigrating at a rate that should alarm a leadership that has not yet grasped the severity of the talent drain.
The constitutional architecture offers no easy escape. Kuwait’s parliamentary system, unlike the rubber-stamp legislatures elsewhere in the Gulf, cannot simply be abolished or restructured without a fundamental rupture in the social contract. What the new emir can do — and what his predecessors have repeatedly failed to do — is build the political coalitions that make governance possible. The question is whether the will exists to do it.
دائماً ما كان النظام السياسي الكويتي فريداً في منطقة الخليج. يتمتع برلمانه، الأقدم في المنطقة، بسلطة تشريعية حقيقية وتقليد راسخ في المعارضة وتاريخ في تحدي الحكومات وإسقاطها. غير أنه لم يمتلك، على مدى معظم العقد الماضي، علاقة وظيفية مع السلطة التنفيذية قادرة على صياغة سياسات متماسكة.
الجمود الأخير هو الأشد وطأة في الذاكرة السياسية الكويتية. حجب البرلمان الحالي ثلاثة موازنات متتالية، واستجوب سبعة وزراء، وأجبر رئيسين للوزراء على الاستقالة. المشكلة في النهاية ليست دستورية بل سياسية، وحلها لا يكون إلا بإعادة بناء الثقة بين السلطتين.